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PSEUDO-RANDOM SEQUENCE GENERATORS 
USING STRUCTURED NOISE 
R. S. Safavi-Naini and J. R. Seberry 
Stream ciphers use the output of .. Pseudo-Random (PR) generator to mask the inform ..... 
tion stream. The security of these cipber systems ultimately depends on the structure of 
the PR generator. There are some minimum necessary criteria such as long period, flat 
statistical distribution and high linear complexity that the PR generator of a stream cipher 
system should satisfy to resist th" basic cryptanalytic attacks on such systems. We pro-
pose a class of PR generators using the coset elements of a Reed-Muller code. The linear 
CQmplexity of these generators is analysed and conditions that a.ssure the highest possible 
linear complexity for them are specified. It is shOWll tha.t the .. bove mentioned criteria 
do not gurantee the security of a stream cipher system and the proposed PR generator, 
although it satisfies all of them, is not secure. 
1. Introduction. 
Stream ciphers assimilate the one time pad, the only provably perfect secure sys-
tem. However with the replacement of the random generator by a pseudo-random (PR) 
one, the perfect security of the system vanishes. It is easy to see that the assessment of 
the security of these systems is directly related to the properties of the PR generator. 
There are some necessary criteria which must be satisfied by the PR generator of a 
secure stream cipher. It is recognised that these generators should satisfy Golomb's 
criteria and have high linear complexity [I], [3]. Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) 
generated sequences satisfy Golomb's criteria but have a small linear complexity and 
hence fail to offer high security. There have been many attempts to devise algorithms 
based on LFSR's that retain the good properties of these sequences and increase the 
linear complexity of them. In this paper we propose noise addition as a mechanism to 
achieve the above.mentioned goal. In the rest of this section we briefly review some 
relevant background material. In Section 2, the properties of some special subsets of 
the binary vector space of dimension 2m - 1 are studied and the results are used in 
Section 3 to develop a new class of stream ciphers. The paper is concluded by estab-
lishing the insufficiency of linear complexity and Golomb's criteria for the security of 
PR generators. 
Linear Equivalence. A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a finite state ma-
chine, the state of which at time t is determined by its content at time t and its next 
state is determined by its feedback function (we consider the binary case only). 
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Figure l. 
The feedback polynomial of the LFSR is defined B.8 
C(D) = 1 + ciD + OlD2 + ... + c....D"', 
where c;'s are binary feedback coefficients. Let.9 = .'10,81,82, ••• denote the semi-infinite 
output sequence of the LFSR. The D-transform of sis SCD) defined by 
SeD) = So + .'lID + SZD2 + .... 
The output sequence s is a periodic sequence, the period of which is determined by 
the properties of C(D) {I]. An m-sequence bas the maximum period, 2'" -1, and cor-
responds to the case when the feedback polynomial is primitive. (See the contribution 
by Dawson in these Proceedings.) The D-transform of a sequence s generated by an 
LFSR can be written as: 
P(D) 
S(D) ~ C(D)' 
where P'is a polynomial with degree less than m. In fact there is a one-to-one cor-
respondence between polynomials of degree less than m and the set of 2m - 1 output 
sequences of the LFSR corresponding to the 2m -1 nOD-zero possible initial conditions. 
Every periodic sequence s of period T can be thought of as generated by a LFSR 
of length T. The D-transform of the sequence can be written as; 
S(D) ~ S(D)" 
l+DT 
where S(D)· denotes the D-transform of the first period. By cancelling the common 
factors from the numerator and the denominator one can find the LFSR of minimwn 
length that can generate the sequence. The length of this LFSR is the linear equivalence 
of the sequence and is taken as a measure of its complexity. 
The first periods of periodic sequences of period T constitute aT-dimensional 
vector space VT. The linear equivalence of v in VT is denoted by L( v) and defined as 
the linear equivalence of the semi-infinite sequence with first period equal to v. The 
D-transfonn of v is defined as the D-transform of the first period of tbis sequence. One 
set of basic vectors can be obtained by decomposing 1 + DT into irreducible factors: 
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where C;(D)'s are irreducible polynomials over GF(2). By applying a partial fraction 
expansion to SeD), the D-transform of a sequence s of period T, we have 
_ P;(D)* 
S(D) - L C.(D) , 
• 
which shows the sequence can be generated by adding (modulo 2) the output of some 
basic LFSR's with irreducible feedback polynomials given by C,(D) and their initial 
content determined by Pi (D). The total length of the basic LFSR's is equal to T. 
Example 1: Let the first period of a sequence s be: 
101 0 101 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
and SeD) denotes its D-transform. Partial fraction expansion of SeD) results in: 
1 + D2 + Dol + D6 + D1 + D8 + D13 + D14 
SeD) = 1 + DIS 
D 1 
= 1 + D + D2 + "-:+~D"'+-Dm', -:+-D"" -:+'Dn.· 
So the sequence can be generated by a LFSR of length 6. 
Figure 2. 
Reed-Mu.ller Code. Binary Reed-Muller code of order r and length 2m -1, denoted 
by RM( r, m) is the set of all Boolean functions f of m Boolean variables VI, V'l, •.• ,Um 
where f( Vl, V2, ..• , v m) is a polynomial of order at most r when written in algebraic 
normal form [2J. The Reed-Muller code of order one comprises the set of linear Boolean 
functions of m variables and can be partitioned into two subsets one of which is the 
set of complement vectors of the other: 
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where Om is a subspace by itself and has an all-zero column. The linear code obtained 
by deleting this column, denoted by O~, is in fact the set of m-sequences generated by 
a LFSR with the primitive feedback polynomial equal to the parity check polynomial 
of 0;;'. The minimum distance of O~ is 2m-.1 and can correct 2,!,-2 -1 errors. Hence 
in the standard array correspnding to 0:', all vectors of weight 2m - 2 - 1 appear as 
coset leaders and these cosets can be identified by their leaders [3]. 
Example f!: The generator polynomial g( x) and the parity check polynomial h( x) 
of 0; are ; 
g(x) = 1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = (1 + x)(l + x + x 3) 
h(x)=1+x2 +x3 
The non-zero codewords (listed below) can be generated by a LFSR with feedback 
polynomial C(D) = 1 + D2 + D3; 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Figure 3. 
2. PR Sequences from RM(l,m). 
The following propositions give some classification of the elements of VT in terms 
of their linear equivalence. 
Proposition 1. The linear equivalence oj the 1!ector~ oj 0:;' is m. 
Proof. Follows from the fact that the codewords are m-sequences. 
Proposition 2. Let e E VT (T = 2m - 1), be 0. coset leader oj 0:;' with L( e) = h. 
The linear equivalence Ie of all but at most one oj the dementi of the coset with e as 
the leader is the same. The only possible values of le are hand h ± m. 
Proof· See [4]. 
>3, 
So cosets of 0;' are subsets of constant (almost) linear equivalence and coset 
decomposition of VT can be regarded as decomposition in terms of linear complexity 
also. In fact, to specify the linear equivalence of a vector, it is almost always enough 
to detennine the coset to which it belongs. T~s is the standard decoding problem of 
0;' which is well stuwed [2]. 
Proposition 3. Let e E VT (T = 2m -1) and wee) = 1. Then L(e) = 2m _l. 
Proof· See [4]. 
Corollary. In every CQ$et of weight one of 0;' there exist3 exactly one vector 0/ 
linear equivalence 2m - 1 - m. All the other vectors have linear equivalence 2m - 1. 
This gives an explicit expression of the linear equivalence of all vectors of cosets of 
weight one and shows that almost all these vectors have the highest linear equivalence. 
Dependence of the linear equivalence of coset elements on the weight of the coset leaders 
canIlot be extended to higher weights for which the specific error pattern affects the 
complexity of the vector. Let wee) denote the Hamming weight of e. 
Proposition 4. The linear equivalence of a vector e E VT with w( e) = 2, depend3 
on the di3tance between the two non-zero component". If thi3 di3tance is denoted by t 
and deg(gcd(l + Dt, 1 + DT)) = u, then Lee) = T - u. 
Proof. See [4J. 
Corollary. The linear equivalence of veetorJ of cout" of weight two of 0;' dependJ 
on the diJtanee t between the two non-zero component" of the coset leader. If we have 
T = 2m - 1 and deg(gcd(1 + DI, 1 + DT)) = u, then the linear complexity of the C03et 
element i3 at lea3t 2m - 1 - u - m. 
Example 9. Consider the vectors of weight 2 in VIS. Let t be the distance between 
the non-zero bits of a. vector e where w( e) = 2. The possible values of t are 1,2, ... , 14 
which result in the following values for the linear equivalence: 
t 
L(e) 
1 2 3 4 
14 14 12 14 
5 6 7 
10 12 14 
8 9 
14 12 
10 11 
10 14 
12 13 14 
12 14 14 
It should be noted that the di8tance between the two non-zero components and not 
their actual position is important. So all the vector8 listed below have the same linear 
equivalence 10 corresponding to t = 10 in the above table: 
el 100000000010000 
ez 010000000001000 
e3001000000000100 
e4 000100000000010 
e5000010000000001 
For cosets of weight greater than two the linear complexity is independent of the shift 
in the error pattern. 
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Proposition 5. Let C(D) = DI:E(D), E(O) = 1, denote the D-traU8/Qrm of a 
w"et leader e and deg(gcd(E(D), 1 + DT» = u (T = 2m - 1). The linear complexity 
of a coset element is at lefMt 2m ""- 1 - it - m. 
Proof. The D-transform of a. sequence with first period given by e is 
E(D) 
l+DT (T=2m_l). 
It follows that the linear equivalence of this sequence is T -u and the linear equivalence 
of a vector of the coset with e as a leader is at least T - u - m. In fact there is exactly 
one vector of this complexity and the linear complexity of the rest is T - u. 
Corollary 1. Let e E VT and E( D) be a power of a prime polynomial. Then 
L(e) ~ 2--1. 
Corollary 2. Let e and e' be two vectors 0/ length T = 2m - 1 such that 
Then L( e) = L( e'l. 
Proof. Follows from the fact that 
gcd(E.(D),l + DT) ~ gcd(E.,,(D), 1+ DT). 
3. Key Generators Using Structured Noise. 
One can use noise addition to increase the linear equivalence of a vector. A PR-
generator based on this idea is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. 
The LFSR generates an m-sequence of period T which is added modulo two to 
a noise sequence of the same period. The noise register contains a class of noise 
vectors of length T that have high linear equivalence and are easy to generate (easy to 
describe). The class is parametrized by a piece of the key infonnation. A common key 
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in transmitter and receiver produces the same PR-sequence at botb ends. This is an 
easy and fast way of enhancing the linear complexity of an m-sequence. A large number 
of noise sequences stored in the register will prevent a cryptanalyst from recovering 
the m-sequence ea.sily. Propositions 3 and 4 imply that all vectors of weight one and 
a large number of vectors of weight two (the linear equivalence of the vector should 
be determined) can be included in the noise register. Using Proposition 5 it can be 
seen that finding the proper noise vector is equivalent to finding polynomials which are 
relatively prime to 1 + D T , or have a ged of small degree. Proposition 6 specifies a class 
of polynomials that correspond to vectors of high linear complexity. This result can 
be combined with the corollary to Proposition 5 to characterise suitable noise vectors. 
We need the following definition. 
Definition ([3]). The cyclotomic co"et mod n over GF(q) which contains s is 
C8 ={S,sq,sq2, ...... ,sqT.}, wheresqm. =:::smodn, T.=m.-1. 
Proposition 6. A "eq1lence of length 2m - 1 that con"ist" of t consecutive one", 
where t i" a prime such that gcd(t,2m -1) = 1 and t has only two cyclotomic co8eu, 
ha:J linear eq1livalence 2m - L 
Proof. Let T = 2= -1. Since, by hypothesis, gcd(t,2m -1) = 1, it follows that 
gcd(1 + D t , 1 + DT) = 1. FUrther, since t has only two cyclotomic cosets, 
H 
1 +D' ~ (J+D)· LD'. 
;=0 
Now it is easy to see that 
where the second polynomial corresponds to a vector of t consecutive zeros. 
Security. It is easy to see that the PR generator discussed in this section satisfies 
Golomb's criteria [1] closely, if we restrict the weight of the noise sequences used in 
the noise register to small values (compared to the length of the LFSR). It is also 
noted that the proper selection of noise vectors ensures a lower bound on the linear 
complexity of the output sequence. However the small weight of the noise vectors 
implies that the first period of the sequence can be approximated by a LFSR sequence 
and would be highly predictable after 2m (m is the length of LFSR) bits of it were 
intercepted. So the sequence is not secure. 
4. Concluding Remarks. 
The study of linear complexity of a Reed-Muller code and its cosets suggests a 
new way of increasing the linear equivalence of an m-sequence. The results are applied 
to devise a PR generator. The added complexity is the result of adding a noise vector 
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with high linear equivalence to the m-sequence. H the weight of the noise vector is one, 
the statistical parameters of the original m-sequence would not be greatly affected and 
the resulting sequence would closely satisfy the known criteria. of security. It is noticed 
that in general for noise vectors of SIIlall wmght the generator is not secure because 
the output can be approximated by an m-sequence. On the other hand, noise vectors 
of higher weight deteriorate the statistical properties of the m-sequence. 
The PR sequences obtained from the elements of coaets of weight one demonstrate 
the insufficiency of the criteria used for assessing the PR generators of stream ciphers. 
Providing criteria to measure the security of such systems remains au open problem. 
References 
1. H. Becker and F. Piper, Cipher SYJtemJ. (North Books, London, 1982.) 
2. F. J. MacWilliams and N. J. Sloane, The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes, 
(North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978.) 
3. R A. Rueppel, Analysi3 and De3ign of Stream Ciphers. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin 
1986.) 
4. R S. Safavi-Naini and J. R Seberry, 'Pseudo-Random Sequences from Codes' 
Technical Report CS89/1O, University College, University of New South Wales 
Canberra, Australia. 
Department of Comput~r Sci~nr;e, Uni"ersity College, The UniVerAity of New South Wal~~, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, ACT £600, AUSTRALIA. 
